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abstract
In this paper I focus on what we can call “the obvious assumption” in the debate between defenders and 
deniers (of the reductionist sort) of cognitive phenomenology: conscious thought is phenomenal and 
phenomenal thought is conscious. This assumption can be refused if “conscious” and “phenomenal” are 
not co-extensive in the case of thought. I discuss some prominent ways to argue for their dissociation 
and I argue that we have reasons to resist such moves, and thus, that the “obvious assumption” can be 
transformed into a grounded claim one can explicitly believe and defend.
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THE CONSCIOUS AND PHENOMENAL CHARACTER OF THOUGHT
The recent literature on cognitive phenomenology has revolved around the question of the 
existence of a kind of phenomenal character specific to thought, thinking or cognitive states 
and processes (Bayne and Montague 2011). Defenders of cognitive phenomenology believe, 
while deniers do not, that there is at least specific or proprietary phenomenal character of 
thought1. Arguments in the debate have put forward topics such as the temporality of thought, 
inner speech, intentionality, categorical perception, or value (see Jorba and Moran 2016 for a 
review) and the question has also included approaches from the phenomenological tradition in 
philosophy (Breyer and Gutland 2016). Importantly, there is one shared assumption among both 
defenders and one kind of deniers of cognitive phenomenology, namely, the idea that conscious 
thought is phenomenal in the first place. By this I mean phenomenal in general, not specifically 
sensory or cognitive phenomenal – on pain of begging the question. It is by assuming this claim 
that the parties that have mainly engaged in the discussion start arguing against each other.
On the side of defenders of cognitive phenomenology, it is clear that they assume that 
conscious thought is phenomenal simpliciter – as the basis of afterwards arguing that it is 
cognitive-phenomenal. But this is also the case on the side of some deniers of cognitive 
phenomenology. Tye and Wright, for instance, claim that “we are not opposing the following 
thesis: For any conscious thought t and any subject s, there is something that it is like for 
s when she thinks t” (2011, p. 328). Or Prinz, who thinks all phenomenal consciousness is 
perceptual phenomenal consciousness, presents the debate as follows: “the debate I’m 
interested in is not about whether conceptual activity can feel like something to a subject, 
but whether it feels different than sensory activity” (Prinz 2011, p. 177). We can see that 
these deniers of cognitive phenomenology state (and assume) that conscious thought “feels” 
like something, and thus it has a certain phenomenal character; what they disagree with 
defenders of cognitive phenomenology is on the nature of such phenomenality – they see 
such phenomenal character as not specifically cognitive but rather sensory or emotional, for 
instance (we can thus call these views “reductionists”). 
However, the assumption that conscious thought is phenomenal simpliciter might be doubted 
to begin with. This is the case of another view within deniers of cognitive phenomenology, 
1 Stronger claims of defenders of cognitive phenomenology include a distinctive and individuative phenomenal 
character for thought, or the claim that thought content is grounded in phenomenal character (see Pitt 2004, 
Strawson 2008, among others).







namely, eliminativists regarding the phenomenal character of thought or cognition (of 
whatever kind). In this sense, Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson state that “cognitive states are 
prime examples of states for which there is not something it is like to be in them, of states 
that lack a phenomenology” (Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 2007, p. 129). If this line of 
argumentation succeeds, the cognitive phenomenology view can be debunked, and also the 
debate between defenders of cognitive phenomenology and deniers of the reductionist sort 
would not even get off the ground.
The mentioned assumption can be seen as part of a larger argument, that states the following: 
(i) If a mental state is conscious, then it has phenomenal character; (ii) Conscious thoughts 
are conscious mental states; (Conclusion) Conscious thoughts have phenomenal character. A 
version of this argument was proposed by Pitt (2004), who labelled it “the obvious argument”. 
The name of this argument comes from the possible objection of seeing it as trivially true. 
That is, if we consider one sense of “conscious” that just means phenomenal (Block 1995) or 
analytically entails phenomenal, then the argument is trivially true. But this in fact cannot 
be so, as there are many who are inclined to deny (i) – then the argument does not seem that 
obvious. Moreover, (C) is not necessarily true if consciousness and phenomenal character 
come apart in the case of conscious thought. That is, the possibility of conscious thought 
without phenomenal character would go against (i) and would allow one to deny (C). 
The possibility of “conscious” meaning phenomenal or entailing phenomenal does not seem 
conceptually necessary because the two concepts are distinct (Burge 1997; Lormand 1996; Kim 
1996). I have so far presented the idea that conscious thoughts are phenomenal as a shared 
assumption between defenders of cognitive phenomenology and deniers of the reductionist 
sort, but notice also that the claim that unconscious thoughts do not have phenomenal 
character is also somehow assumed in the debate. In this respect, Bayne and Montague state: 
“we start with a point that is common ground among all parties to the debate: dispositional 
or unconscious states have no phenomenological character” (2011, p. 11). Also, Kriegel 
talks about “phenomenally unconscious states” in the following way: “by ‘phenomenally 
unconscious’ states I mean states that are unconscious in the phenomenal sense of ‘conscious’; 
I do not mean to refer to, or even suggest the existence of, states that are unconscious but 
nonetheless have a phenomenal character” (Kriegel 2011, p. 79, my emphasis). Levine, who denies 
cognitive phenomenology, also claims: “mental states that lack phenomenal character are all 
those states, including non-occurrent beliefs and desires, that are classified as unconscious” 
(Levine 2011, p. 103). From these quotes we can see that phenomenality (as far as the cognitive 
domain is concerned) is normally assumed by both parties to be associated with conscious 
thought and not with unconscious thought (or states, more generally).
In this paper I focus on these two mentioned aspects, which we can call “the obvious 
assumption” in the debate between defenders and deniers (of the reductionist sort) of 
cognitive phenomenology: conscious thought is phenomenal and phenomenal thought 
is conscious. This assumption can be refused if “conscious” and “phenomenal” are not 
co-extensive in the case of thought, and so the following possibilities are open: (a) non-
phenomenal conscious thoughts and (b) phenomenal unconscious thoughts. In the next two 
sections, I discuss some prominent ways to argue for (a) and (b) and I argue that we have 
reasons to resist such moves, and thus, that the “obvious assumption” can be transformed into 
a grounded claim one can explicitly believe and defend2.
2  Note that by arguing against such possibilities, one still remains neutral regarding the debate between defenders of 
cognitive phenomenology and deniers of the reductionist sort, as the aim is just preserving the idea that “conscious” 
and “phenomenal” are co-extensive terms when applied to thought.
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There are several accounts defending the view that we have conscious thought but that it 
is non-phenomenal. One could think that reductionists do present a prominent example, 
given that the sense in which conscious thought is not phenomenal is that it is not specifically 
cognitive – phenomenal, namely, that it does not enjoy a specific phenomenal character. Thus, 
what reductionists deny is not that there is phenomenally conscious thought, but just that 
there is cognitive-specific phenomenal conscious thought. They argue that conscious thought 
is phenomenal but its phenomenal character can be explained by appealing to familiar kinds 
of phenomenal character such as sensory, perceptual, emotional or bodily phenomenal 
character. I have argued elsewhere against two main reductionist views (Jorba 2015), and it is 
not my purpose to enter in such discussion here. Nothing I say here depends on whether these 
views succeed or, in contrast, if cognitive phenomenology views are correct; as I have said, 
both parties as described assume the claims I am concerned with here that can be understood 
as the idea of the co-extensiveness of the conscious and the phenomenal character of thought. 
Notice, however, that the assumption that conscious thought is phenomenal is indeed simply 
denied by the above mentioned eliminativists, such as Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007). 
The following section is an attempt to examine in which ways one can substantiate the 
eliminativist idea that conscious thought is not phenomenal, besides merely stating it.
In Kim (1996) there is a way of arguing that phenomenal and conscious may come apart. After 
leaving aside unconscious states as possible bearers of phenomenal character (another 
instance of one aspect of the “obvious assumption”, treated below) Kim asks whether occurrent 
conscious instances of belief3 are characterized by a “special qualitative character unique to 
beliefs” with a certain content. And his answer is “no”, given that a belief about George 
Washington, for example, may have a mental image of him or the words “George Washington” 
passing through one’s mind, etc., or “no particular mental image or any other sort of 
phenomenal occurrence at all” (Kim 1996, p. 158). In this answer we see that Kim is using 
what can be called definitional restriction of “phenomenal character”. Phenomenal character is 
understood as just sensory phenomenal character, and given that beliefs can be accompanied 
by images or words or any of these elements, there is no specific qualitative character of 
conscious belief. It is worth noting that if one construes “phenomenal character” as just 
sensory phenomenal character, the debate on cognitive phenomenology is biased from the 
start and reductionist positions are right. This definitional restriction of the notion is certainly 
not an isolated use in the literature, but rather a common way of talking in philosophy of mind 
during most of the second half of the XXth century. 
Kim then addresses the question of whether there is something like a “belief-like phenomenal 
character” in conscious occurrent beliefs, that is, in beliefs we are actively entertaining. He 
claims that some people think that in occurrent beliefs there is a certain feel of assertoric 
or affirmative judging, something like an “Oh, yes!” feeling (Brown 2007 presents the 
feeling of conviction as that associated with belief). Similarly, an occurrent disbelief can be 
accompanied by an experience of denial and remembering is accompanied by a feeling of 
déjàvu. Wants and desires could be accompanied by a sense of yearning or longing combined 
with a sense of present deprivation. All these experiences could count as specific to the cognitive 
state but, in fact, Kim describes them as the “coming to be aware that we believe a certain 
proposition” (Kim 1996, p. 159), where this coming to be aware is not accompanied by any 
3  One might doubt that the category of “occurrent belief” is appropriate, as beliefs are normally construed as being 
dispositional states. But I will follow Kim’s terminology here, and skeptics of occurrent beliefs can apply the reasoning 









kind of sensory quality: “When you are unsure whether you really believe some proposition, 
say, that euthanasia is morally permissible, that Mozart is a greater composer than Beethoven, 
or that Clinton will win in 1996, you do not look for a sensory quale of a special type” (Kim 
1996, p. 159). This contrasts with what happens when you are asked if you feel pain in the 
elbow, in which case you presumably look for a sensory quale of a special type. One first 
thing to note with respect to Kim’s position is that the definitional restriction he operates 
with (phenomenal as sensory in kind) precludes the possibility of a belief-like phenomenal 
character, but this certainly by itself does not preclude specific “feelings” for conscious 
thought. But what does indeed preclude this last option is what this phenomenal character is 
supposed to be able to do, that is, to type identify the kind of state we are talking about4.
In this section we have used Kim’s view as paradigmatic of a particular perspective that has 
been very common in the field, namely, to use “phenomenal character” with the definitional 
restriction to sensory states or sensory elements. This is of particular interest here insofar it 
allows one to envisage a possible dissociation between phenomenal and conscious character in 
thought (belief, in Kim’s case). However, the definitional restriction does not really present a 
viable position in the cognitive phenomenology debate because it directly amounts to a denial 
of cognitive phenomenology without further argument.
A more promising way to reject the claim that a mental state is conscious if and only if it 
has phenomenal character is by presenting the case of access conscious thought without 
phenomenal consciousness. Block’s famous distinction between access consciousness 
(A-consciousness) and phenomenal consciousness (P-consciousness) is relevant here. The idea 
would  be to equate phenomenal consciousness to experience and contrast it with access 
consciousness. A mental state is phenomenally conscious if there is something it is like to be in 
it, and it is access conscious if its content is available for reasoning and the rational control of 
action (Block 1995). Block provides sensory states as the paradigm example of phenomenal and 
propositional attitudes as the paradigm example of access conscious states. By distinguishing 
between the two notions in this way, Block encourages the view that propositional attitudes are 
not phenomenally conscious, and thus thoughts would not have phenomenal character. This 
seems to be a very influential assumption in the field.
However, as he introduces both terms, he does not deny that thoughts have phenomenal 
character (or analogously, that sensations can be access conscious). In fact, he claims that it 
is unclear what the phenomenal character of thought involves: “One possibility is that it is 
just a series of mental images or subvocalizations that make thoughts P-conscious. Another 
possibility is that the contents themselves have a P-conscious aspect independent of their 
vehicles” (Block 1995, p. 24 footnote 3). The two possibilities Block sees for the phenomenal 
character of thought phenomenology are, thus, non-specific cognitive phenomenology, for 
which mental images and sensory elements make the thought phenomenally conscious, and 
phenomenal cognitive content, which will not be identified with the sensory vehicles. In fact, 
these are not the only possibilities, given that there could be phenomenal character associated 
with different cognitive attitudes (in addition to, or instead of, content phenomenology – see 
Klausen 2008; Jorba 2016).
We could first notice that, contrary to what it might have seemed, the notion of 
A-consciousness is not really a form of consciousness. With respect to this, it is symptomatic 
4  The issue of type identification is certainly important and worth taking into account in the cognitive 
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that Block (2007) gives up the notion of access consciousness and talks about cognitive accessibility, 
which is a functional property that underlies reporting. This change of terminology indicates 
that there are not two fundamental kinds of consciousness, as the initial terms suggest, but 
just one kind, whereas the other notion is meant to capture a purely functional property. 
Although this might always have been the case from the beginning when he introduces the 
distinction, talk of access-consciousness has confused the issue. As Montague notes, “Block 
originally introduced the notion of A-consciousness precisely as an attempt to see how close 
a state could get to being a genuinely conscious state, i.e. a phenomenally conscious state, 
without actually being a conscious state at all” (Montague 2016, p. 171). Thus, one first source 
of caution goes against considering access consciousness as a form of consciousness at all, 
so that the possibility of non-phenomenal access conscious thoughts would not amount to 
a form of consciousness but to a functional property that makes the content of the thought 
available for reasoning and rational control of action. What has to be shown in any case is that 
the existence of this functional property in thought precludes the existence of phenomenal 
conscious thought. The only thing the existence of a cognitive accessible thought shows is 
that the content of this thought is available for reasoning and rational control, but there is no 
implication from there to thought’s contents being not able to be P-conscious.
However, even if access consciousness is not really a form of consciousness, one could argue 
that independently of how we characterize the notion, it suffices to explain what needs to be 
accounted for in relation to thought, so there is no further need to appeal to phenomenality. 
Let us now present the main line of argument against this possibility of the dissociation 
of the conscious and the phenomenal character. That we can have access to the content 
so four thoughts is something that should be uncontroversial, because otherwise, how 
could we explain the conscious control that we have over our own actions? And normally, 
one is A-conscious of the same thing (same kind of content) one is P-conscious of. Block 
seems to illustrate this, when he is discussing the possibility of P-consciousness without 
A-consciousness: 
Suppose that you are engaged in intense conversation when suddenly at noon you 
realize that right outside your window, there is – and has been for sometime – a 
pneumatic drill digging up the street. You were aware of the noise all along, one might 
say, but only at noon are you consciously aware of it. That is, you were P-conscious of 
the noise all along, but at noon you are both P-conscious and A-conscious of it (Block 
1995, p. 234).
This way of presenting the distinction suggests that the distinction has nothing to do with 
different kinds of contents, so it seems reasonable to assume that we are P- and A-conscious 
of the same contents. Moreover, the example suggests that A-consciousness consists in 
being aware of what is already P-conscious – at least in this and analogous cases. One could 
try to deny this by appealing to the overflow argument, which leads Block to conclude that 
P-consciousness overflows A-consciousness. He refers to this issue as follows:
One of the most important issues concerning the foundations of conscious perception 
centers on the question of whether perceptual consciousness is rich or sparse. 
The overflow argument uses a form of “iconic memory” to argue that perceptual 
consciousness is richer (i.e., has a higher capacity) than cognitive access: when 
observing a complex scene we are conscious of more than we can report or think about 
(Block 2011a, p. 1).
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But notice that what Block argues is that P-consciousness has a higher capacity, but he does 
not deny that we are P- and A-conscious of the same contents. So it seems that normally 
we are P- and A-conscious of the same kind of content and that what is A-conscious is also 
P-conscious. With respect to this, Kriegel (2006) presents the view that P-consciousness is the 
basis of A-consciousness, that is, the for-me-ness aspect of P-conscious states (that they are self-
consciously entertained) is what makes those states available for cognitive control. This view 
draws on the distinction between qualitative (what-it-is-likeness) and subjective character (for-
me-ness) and also shows, importantly for my purposes here, that the distinction between A- and 
P-consciousness has nothing to do with the contents or with the things we are conscious of 5.
One could resist the claim that what is A-conscious is also P-conscious by appealing to the 
imaginary case of the superblindsighter, which is introduced as a case of A-consciousness 
without P-consciousness: the superblindsight patient is a person that can guess what is in 
the blind portion of her visual field without being told to guess, that is, without prompting 
(this is the main difference with the blind sight patient). She spontaneously says that she 
knows that there is an X in her visual field although she cannot see it. As Block notes, the 
thought of the superblindsighter is both A-conscious and P-conscious but what he is talking 
about is the state of the perceptual system, which is A-conscious without being P-conscious6. 
The superblindsighter case shows that what is A-conscious is not necessarily P-conscious. 
However, this is an extreme case and normally in all other cases it is true that what is 
A-conscious is also P-conscious, or at least this seems to be assumed in the literature. In any 
case, for our present purposes, in order to claim that A-consciousness is not P-consciousness 
in thought, one would have to show that the normal case of conscious thought is as atypical as 
is the superblindsighter case in perceptual experience. My contention is, thus, that one would 
have to show that in conscious thought we are normally conscious in the atypical way in which 
the superblindsighter is perceptually conscious. To my knowledge, the case for this has not 
been made and the prospects for doing it do not appear prima facie very plausible.
To recapitulate: firstly, the notion of A-consciousness or cognitive accessibility (if it is a notion 
of consciousness at all) does not preclude conscious thought from also being phenomenal. In 
fact, the implication from A- to P-consciousness seems to be what is assumed in the discussion 
of the distinction in the perceptual case. This implication is just what is questioned by the 
superblindsighter case, which does not seem to pose a problem for conscious thought. Drawing 
on the discussion of Block’s distinction and examples, we have reasons to believe that what is 
A-conscious is normally also P-conscious7.
Let us turn to a second different movement to deny the co-extensiveness of the conscious 
and the phenomenal character: cases of non-conscious phenomenal thought8. As I already 
mentioned in the first section, it is worth noting that a commonly held assumption among 
5  See also Clément and Malerstein (2003) for an ontogenetic account of consciousness according to which 
P-consciousness is a precondiction for A-consciousness: they present empirical evidence in developmental psychology 
for the claim that P-consciousness is present at a very early age and is what makes A-consciousness possible.
6  “Of course, the superblind sighter has a thought that there is an ‘X’ in his blindfield that is both A-conscious and 
P-conscious. But I am not talking about the thought. Rather, I am talking about the state of his perceptual system that 
gives rise to the thought. It is this state that is A-conscious without being P-conscious” (Block 1995, p. 233).
7  See Jorba and Vicente (2014) for the argument that defenders of cognitive phenomenology are in an advantageous 
position than deniers when it comes to explaining how we can have access to the contents of our thoughts.
8  These cases are different from putative cases of phenomenal consciousness without access consciousness or 
cognitive accessibility – discussed with reference to the overflow argument, Block (2011a) – in that the ones presented 
in this section do not involve any conscious character, whereas in the overflow cases it is argued that we have 
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most parties in the cognitive phenomenology debate is that non-conscious or unconscious 
states have no phenomenal character (Kim 1996; Pitt 2004; Levine 2011; Prinz 2011; Tye and 
Wright 2011). In what follows I will consider two ways in which one could argue for the 
existence of non-conscious phenomenal thought, and I will argue that they do not in fact 
provide good reasons to believe in this kind of phenomenon.
The conceivability of non-conscious phenomenal states has been explored by Burge (1997) 
through his distinction between “phenomenality” and “phenomenal consciousness”. The 
idea here is not to separate phenomenality from another form of consciousness but rather 
phenomenality (what-it-is-likeness) from phenomenal consciousness (what it is occurrently 
like for the individual):
although phenomenal qualities are individuated in terms of what it is like to feel or to 
be conscious of them, one may have phenomenal states or events with phenomenal 
qualities that one is unconscious of. Thus, phenomenal qualities themselves do not 
guarantee phenomenal consciousness. To be phenomenally conscious, phenomenal 
states, or their phenomenal qualities, must be sensed or felt by the individual subject 
(Burge 2007, p. 383).
Pains that are not felt because of some distraction or obstruction are an example. These 
may remain pains even though they are not conscious for the subject at certain points. 
Similarly and applied to our case, thoughts would also retain their phenomenality in cases 
in which they are not conscious. This would open the door to the idea that phenomenality 
is not enough for phenomenal consciousness and, thus, it would be absurd to maintain that 
an occurrent episode of thinking with some phenomenal character is a form of phenomenal 
consciousness.
Burge suggests that there are phenomenal properties or qualities that are not felt by the 
subject. An element that would make this position understandable would be to appeal to 
attention. If the subject does not pay attention to the pain, for example, “she does not feel 
it”, but the pain could exist with its phenomenal properties. According to this possibility, 
attention would be responsible for making a state phenomenally conscious. But it would be 
wrong to attribute to Burge the association (or equivalence) of attention and phenomenal 
consciousness9: “In entertaining such a distinction I am not merely supposing that the 
individual does not attend to the pain. I mean that the individual does not feel it. It is 
not phenomenally conscious for the individual. Yet the individual still has it. The pain is 
individuated partly in terms of how it consciously feels” (Burge 2007, p. 415). And also:
Phenomenal consciousness is not attention. The states that I have listed can be 
phenomenally conscious whether or not they are attended to, and whether or not 
things sensed through them are attended to. When they are not the objects of attention, 
and when attention does not operate through them, however, the consciousness is 
commonly less intense or robust (Burge 2007, p. 399)10.
9  A development of this idea is precisely Prinz’s theory of consciousness (2012).
10  The states he lists are felt pains, felt tickles, felt hunger pangs; qualitative elements in conscious vision, hearing, 
smell, or taste; feelings of tiredness or strain from effort; the feels associated with touch, phenomenal blur and 
phenomenal static (Burge 2007, p. 398).







There has to be another element, then, that is responsible for the distinction between 
phenomenality and phenomenal consciousness. This turns out to be the effective occurrence of 
the state regarding the constitutive possibility of becoming conscious: 
The conceptual distinction is this. On the view I am exploring, an occurrent phenomenal 
quality is constitutively individuated in terms of how it would be felt if it were to become 
conscious. Its nature is constitutively, not just causally or dispositionally, related to 
occurrently conscious ways of feeling. This constitutive point is what makes the quality 
phenomenal even when it is not actually conscious. On this view, the unfelt pain is still 
a pain – not just a neural state or a dispositional state that happens to be capable of 
producing pain under the right conditions – even though it is not occurrently felt and is 
not conscious for the individual (Burge 2007, p. 415, my emphasis).
Burge thus proposes that phenomenal qualities are constitutively capable of becoming 
occurrently conscious, even if they are not always phenomenally conscious. This is a 
distinction between a phenomenal quality and a conscious phenomenal quality and it is what 
allows Burge to claim that there are states that are non-conscious but still have phenomenal 
properties. Both properties are normally co-extensive if there is no obstruction or 
interference. The distinction, though, is a conceptual one, and Burge leaves open the possibility 
of its empirical soundness. If there is no such empirical distinction, he would assume that 
these states do not exist and he would therefore have to accept that every phenomenal quality 
is also conscious11.
Even if this conceptual distinction is merely exploratory, I have some reservations about its 
use. First, and as a minor point, it is not very clear why the phenomenal occurrent property 
that is not conscious is called “phenomenal” at all if it is not felt in any way. But we could 
grant this stipulation. However, secondly, and contrary to what Burge suggests, it does not 
seem possible to empirically test this distinction: what would confirm or refute this conceptual 
possibility? It seems difficult to establish any criteria for testing it. All the methods to 
empirically test the presence of phenomenal consciousness rely, in one way or another, on 
the reports of the subject, even when there are fMRI methods involved: the neural activation 
is measured when the subject is asked a question or is required to do a task. Therefore, it is 
not clear how we could know that a state has phenomenal character if it is not conscious or 
the subject is somehow aware of it, because first-person reports would be of no use. Another 
way to put the point would be to say that when the presence of phenomenal consciousness 
is manifested, this would thereby also show that a phenomenal quality is also present. No 
empirical way to distinguish among these notions seems to be available. Thirdly, continuing 
to entertain this distinction would have as a consequence the proliferation of “hard 
problems” of consciousness, as Pitt (2004, p. 3, footnote 4) notes, as there would be the hard 
problem of phenomenality and the hard problem of consciousness itself, on pain of defining 
“phenomenality” in a way totally alien to the puzzles of phenomenal consciousness. This is 
not a prima facie reason to abandon the distinction, but a consequence whose characterization 
seems difficult even to conceptualize: what would it mean to say that there is a problem 
explaining an occurrent phenomenal property that is not conscious? All these doubts put 
some pressure on the adequacy of the conceptual possibility of dissociating the phenomenal 
character from the conscious one in the way open by Burge’s suggestion.
11  It should be noted that this is an exploratory distinction and not his main point about phenomenal consciousness.
53
THE CONSCIOUS AND PHENOMENAL CHARACTER OF THOUGHT
There is another way of understanding consciousness in which a state may be phenomenal 
without being conscious. This can be so within higher-order theories (HOT) of consciousness, 
for which the qualitative or phenomenal character and consciousness can dissociate or 
come apart. Higher-order approaches to consciousness can be divided into those that think 
that the higher-order state is a perceptual state (Armstrong 1968; Lycan 2004) or a thought 
(Rosenthal 2005). According to the latter, a phenomenally conscious mental state is a state of a 
certain sort that is the object of a (unconscious) higher-order thought, and which causes that 
thought non-inferentially. The object of the thought, namely, the first-order state, can possess 
qualitative character without being conscious:
since states with mental quality occur both consciously and not, mental qualities can 
occur without appearing in one’s stream of consciousness. So one’s being in a state 
with qualitative character is independent of one’s being in a conscious state, and we 
need different theories to explain the two. A theory of consciousness will explain one’s 
mental life subjectively appearing a particular way; a distinct theory must address what 
mental qualities are, independently of whether they occur consciously (Rosenthal 2011, 
p. 435).
Rosenthal’s motivation for dissociating phenomenal qualities and conscious character comes 
from evidence from blind sight patients, presumably described as instantiating phenomenal 
qualities without being conscious or aware of them and subliminal perceiving: “states with 
mental qualities sometimes occur subliminally, that is, when one subjectively takes oneself not 
to be in any such state. And it is quixotic to regard as conscious a state that one subjectively 
takes oneself not to be in” (Rosenthal 2011, p. 434).
If there is the possibility of dissociation of the phenomenal and the conscious character for the 
first-order state at which the higher-order thought is directed, one could think that the theory 
predicts the same when a thought is itself the first-order state and can thus be the target of 
another higher-order state. The idea would then be that we can have phenomenal thoughts 
that are not conscious because there is not a higher-order thought directed at them that 
makes them conscious. 
I think there are different possible responses to that possibility of dissociation. First, as Block 
(2011b) argues, this kind of theory has two possible versions: a modest and an ambitious one. 
The first just aims to give an explanation of one kind of consciousness or consciousness in 
one sense of the term, namely, higher-order consciousness, and reserves the name “quality” 
to the first-order state, without pretending to explain the what-it-is-likeness of this state 
(precisely the question of phenomenal consciousness). The second aims to be an ambitious 
theory that explains phenomenal consciousness or what-it-is-likeness of the first-order 
mental state. Regarding the modest version, we can see that it uses a notion of “quality” that 
is different from phenomenal character as what-it-is-likeness, and so it is of no interest as a 
possible case of phenomenal character without consciousness. The issue would here turn to a 
terminological one without positing a real threat to the co-extensive character of conscious 
and phenomenal character.
In the ambitious version, though, the issue is not terminological because it aims to be a 
theory of phenomenal consciousness, not just of a kind of consciousness that is precisely the 
higher-order one. However, in this case we do not find a dissociation of the conscious and the 
phenomenal character anymore with respect to the first-order state, given that according 
to the theory, the first-order state is phenomenally conscious in virtue of the relation to a 
higher-order thought. What happens with the higher-order thought itself, though? When 







unconscious. This is made clear by the acceptance of the HOT theories of the problem 
they have to respond to regarding the question of how it is that the relation between an 
unconscious thought and an unconscious pain, for example, can make the latter conscious 
(Neander 1998; Zahavi 2006). But when this thought is itself the target of another higher-order 
thought, we cannot say it is phenomenal and unconscious anymore, as it will precisely become 
conscious in virtue of such a relation (when this thought is phenomenal but not conscious 
we come back to the case of the modest version of the theory). The upshot may be, then, 
that under the ambitious reading of the HOT theory, the dissociation between phenomenal 
and conscious character is not found, as the target state is a case with both phenomenal and 
conscious character (phenomenal consciousness) precisely when it is the target of another 
thought. Moreover, one can think of the ambitious version of the HOT theory as an attempt 
at dispensing with phenomenal character in its equating it with a second-order unconscious 
thought, more than a theory that precisely explains such a phenomenal character.
In summary, the possibility of unconscious phenomenal states is undermined by a use of 
“quality” or “phenomenal” in a different way than “phenomenal character” as what-it-is-
likeness (in the modest version of HOT theory) and by the fact that when the theory wants 
to explain phenomenal consciousness (the ambitious version), the dissociation between 
phenomenal and conscious character somehow vanishes12,13. 
As a general reflection for the whole section, it seems that we have reasons to doubt the 
dissociation between phenomenal and conscious character in thought in the form of non-
conscious phenomenal thought presented in this section. It appears more reasonable to think 
that the phenomenal character of a certain state implies the conscious appearance of that 
state, and if the state is unconscious, namely, if it has no presence at all, then we can say that 
it has no phenomenal character. I take this idea to be also a common assumption within the 
phenomenological tradition in philosophy starting with Brentano and Husserl, even if we can 
also find different uses of “consciousness” that could perhaps cast doubt on this assumption 
(see Siewert 2011 for an overview of the term in the phenomenological tradition). In general, 
then, I think we can say the experiential or qualitative features that comprise the phenomenal 
character of a mental state are conscious and qualitative just because they are consciously 
felt. Block summarizes this idea in the following way: “Lacking consciousness requires lacking 
what-it-is-like-ness and so a state of what-it-is-like-ness is a state of consciousness” (Block 
2011b, p. 424).
In this paper I have focused on an important assumption in the debate between defenders 
of cognitive phenomenology and deniers of the reductionist sort, which I have labelled the 
12  As a side reflection on HOT theories, it is worth mentioning that it has been argued by Brown and Mandik 
(2012) that, as theories of phenomenal character, HOT theories are indeed committed to the existence of cognitive 
phenomenology: “It is also easy to see why the view is committed to distinct phenomenology for distinct conscious 
thoughts…This is because what it is like for one, on the higher- order thought theory of consciousness, is determined 
by the exact contents of the higher-order state. So if one represents oneself as thinking that P as opposed to Q we 
should expect that one’s conscious thought will be like thinking that P whereas the other will be like thinking that Q 
for the subject of these thoughts” (Brown and Mandik 2012, p. 7).
13  A similar reflection applies to self-representationalist accounts of consciousness. For Kriegel (2009), there are two 
components to phenomenal consciousness: qualitative (color-ish component, for instance) and subjective character 
(for-me component). However, this theory does not really present a real case of dissociation between phenomenal and 
conscious character, and would present, if any, an orthogonal dissociation of qualitative and subjective character: “a 
phenomenally conscious state’s qualitative character is what makes it the phenomenally conscious state it is, while its 
subjective character is what makes it a phenomenally conscious state at all (Kriegel 2009, p. 1). Both qualitative and 
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“obvious assumption”: the co-extensiveness of the conscious and the phenomenal character in 
thought or, what is the same, the idea that conscious thought is phenomenal and phenomenal 
thought is conscious. It is important to examine this co-extensiveness claim because it can be 
undermined in several ways and this would imply shaking the ground on which the cognitive 
phenomenology debate as presented is set. I have examined some ways to cast doubt on 
the assumption: possible cases of conscious non-phenomenal thought and possible cases of 
unconscious phenomenal thought.
Regarding the first, I have considered Kim’s view for the dissociation and have shown that his 
reasoning was based on a definitional restriction of “phenomenal character”. Another way 
of arguing for cases of conscious but non-phenomenal forms of thought is by considering the 
kind of consciousness involved in thought as just access consciousness. I have argued that 
the notion of access consciousness should not be seen as a form of consciousness but as a 
functional notion that, per se, does not preclude conscious thought from being phenomenal. 
Indeed, we have reasons to believe that A-conscious states are also normally P-conscious ones; 
its denial would imply attributing a surprising level of atypical character to conscious thought.
Regarding the second possibility of dissociation, namely, cases of unconscious phenomenal 
thought, I considered Burge’s conceptual distinction and higher-order thought theories. I have 
shown my reservations about Burge’s distinction and have proposed to understand HOT theories 
as either not talking about phenomenal character (by employing “quality” in another sense) or 
as not presenting real cases of dissociation (when accounting for phenomenal consciousness). 
I should say that I do not have the pretension to exhaust all the logical possibilities one might 
find as proposals of dissociation between the conscious and the phenomenal character in 
thought, but just to examine the most prominent ones and those that prima facie present 
some plausibility. Thus, this paper does not present a knock down argument for the co-
extensiveness claim, but I hope that it at least casts doubt on the dissociation and presents 
reasons to transform a shared assumption in the cognitive phenomenology debate into an 
explicit claim one can confidently believe in and defend14.
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